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A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES FOR
GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
ISSUED TO DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS
The practice of issuing subpoenas to lawyers representing grand jury
targets has come under increasingly heavy fire.1 Courts and commenta-
tors critical of this practice point to its potential chilling effect on the
attorney-client relationship,2 its demoralizing impact on the defense bar,3
1. At its February 1986 assembly, the American Bar Association House of Delegates over-
whelmingly approved a resolution providing that prosecutors "shall not subpoena nor cause a sub-
poena to be issued to an attorney to a grand jury without prior judicial approval in circumstances
where the prosecutor seeks to compel the attorney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person
who is represented by the attorney/witness." 38 CraM. L. REP. (BNA) 2386 (Feb. 19, 1986). Dele-
gates voiced deep concern over a perceived increase in the government's use of grand jury subpoenas
directed at attorneys. One delegate spoke of "growing alarm" in the legal profession that the attor-
ney-client relationship and the sixth amendment right to counsel are "under seige" by prosecutors.
Id. at 2387.
Numerous articles critical of this practice have appeared in the past year. See Krieger & Van
Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client, and the New Law, 22 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 737 (1985); Pierce &
Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of Issuing Grand
Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of Investigations, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 821 (1985); Weiner, Fed-
eral Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal for Reform, 23 AM. CriM. L. REv. 95 (1985);
Note, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Right to Counsel for the Party Under Investigation, 19 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 487 (1985); Note, Benefactor Defense Before the Grand Jury: The Legal Advice and
Incrimination Theories of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 537 (1985); Kurtz,
Attorneys Protest Scrutiny of Fees' Sources, Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1985, at A5, col. 1; Lawyers
and the Mob, N.Y. Times, March 30, 1985, at 22, col. I (editorial); Ross, Issuance of Subpoenas
Upon Lawyers in Criminal Cases: A Defense Attorney's Perspective (March 1985) (article released
in connection with public hearings held on this topic by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York on March 20-21, 1985).
Such criticism, however, is not a new phenomenon. See Reform of the Grand Jury System
Hearings on S. 3274 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 84-86 (1976) (testimony of Melvin B. Lewis); Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v.
Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263 (1976).
2. See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.) (noting
that issuance of attorney-directed subpoena creates "strong possibility that a wedge will be driven
between the attorney and the client and the relationship will be destroyed"), vacated on other
grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
3. See In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103, 107 (D.N. H. 1984) ("[T]o be considered
is the ... reluctance of capable attorneys to continue or to consider a full or partial career in the
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and its distorting effect on the adversarial system.4 The Department of
Justice, finding itself at the center of this controversy, has recently issued
a set of internal guidelines designed to address the problem and stifle the
rising tide of criticism.5 Federal prosecutors are now required to obtain
the authorization of an Assistant Attorney General prior to the issuance
practice of criminal law and the future depletion in the paucity of capable trial lawyers because of a
concatenation of events leading to an abuse of process."), aff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984); In re
Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (noting chilling impact of attorney-directed sub-
poenas on counsel for defendants in criminal cases).
4. See Pierce & Colamarino, supra note I, at 836 (noting deleterious effects on adversary sys-
tem that result when grand jury requires attorney to produce evidence relating to client).
5. Section 9-2.161(a) was added to the United States Attorneys' Manual [hereinafter cited as
USAM] on July 18, 1985. This section provides:
Because of the potential effects upon an attorney-client relationship that may result
from the issuance of a subpoena to an attorney for information relating to the representa-
tion of a client, it is important that the Department exercise close control over the issuance
of such subpoenas. Therefore, the following guidelines shall be adhered to by all members
of the Department in any matter involving a grand jury or trial subpoena.
A. In determining whether to issue a subpoena in any matter to an attorney for
information relating to the representation of a client, the approach must be to strike the
proper balance between the public's interest in the fair administration of justice and effec-
tive law enforcement and individual's right to the effective assistance of counsel.
B. All reasonable attempts shall be made to obtain information from alternative
sources before issuing a subpoena to an attorney for information relating to the representa-
tion of a client, unless such efforts would compromise a criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion or would impair the ability to obtain such information from an attorney if such
attempts prove unsuccessful.
C. All reasonable attempts shall be made to voluntarily obtain information from an
attorney before issuing a subpoena to an attorney for information relating to the represen-
tation of a client, unless such efforts would compromise a criminal investigation or prose-
cution or would impair the ability to subpoena such information from the attorney if such
attempts prove unsuccessful.
D. No subpoena may be issued in any matter to an attorney for information relating
to the representation of a client without the express authorization of the Assistant Attorney
General of the Criminal Division.
F. [sic] In approving the issuance of a subpoena in any matter to an attorney for
information relating to the representation of a client, the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division shall apply the following principles:
(1) In a criminal investigation or prosecution, there must be reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the information sought is
reasonably needed for the successful completion of the investigation or prosecution. The
subpoena must not be used to obtain peripheral or speculative information;
(2) In a civil case, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the information
sought is reasonably necessary to the successful completion of the litigation;
(3) All reasonable attempts to obtain the information from alternative sources shall
have proved to be unsuccessful;
(4) The reasonable need for the information must outweigh the potential adverse
effects upon the attorney-client relationship. In particular, the need for the information
must outweigh the risk that the attorney will be disqualified from representation of the
client as a result of having to testify against the client;
(5) Subpoenas shall be narrowly drawn and directed at material information regard-
ing a limited subject matter and shall cover a reasonably limited period of time; and
(6) The information sought shall not be protected by a valid claim of privilege.
These guidelines on the issuance of grand jury or trial subpoenas to attorneys for
information relating to the representation of clients are set forth solely for the purpose of
internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party
in any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitations on otherwise lawful
investigative or litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.
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of any subpoena that seeks information relating to the legal representa-
tion of a client.6 According to the guidelines, internal authorization to
issue a subpoena requires consideration of specific factors, including rea-
sonable need for the information and exhaustion of alternative sources.
These factors are to be weighed according to the guidelines' overall direc-
tive to balance the public interest in protecting the attorney-client tela-
tionship against the need to assure the completion of a successful
investigation.7
The Department of Justice action was probably spurred by a desire
to discourage judicial experimentation with the more drastic reform pro-
posals now gaining currency in various legal and academic circles. The
proposal currently receiving the most attention involves a judicial polic-
ing of attorney-directed subpoenas by the courts of appeals under the
aegis of "supervisory power." A second approach contemplates an ex-
pansion of the attorney-client privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 9 Still another approach calls for increased protection
of the attorney-client relationship in grand jury proceedings through rec-
ognition of a constitutionally-based right to counsel at the grand jury
stage.10 Underlying each of these alternative proposals is the notion that
some form of extra-executive constraint should be placed upon prosecu-
tors when they seek to subpoena counsel representing grand jury targets.
In light of this premise, it seems likely that critics will be quick to dispar-
age the new Department of Justice guidelines."
This note approaches the problem from a different perspective and
suggests that each of the alternative proposals mentioned above involves
an unwarranted extension of the protection accorded the attorney-client
relationship at the grand jury stage. Proceeding from the argument that
a marked extension of the protection currently afforded is undesirable-
in that such an extension would unduly restrict the grand jury's ability to
carry out its mandate to investigate crime and bring properly founded
charges against appropriate individuals' 2-this note suggests that the
Department of Justice guidelines represent the most appropriate solution
yet proposed. In contrast to the alternative proposals, the new guidelines
6. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(D).
7. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(A).
5. See infra notes 31-64 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 88-108 and accompanying text.
11. Similar criticism was voiced in the early 1970's when the Department of Justice promul-
gated a set of guidelines to govern the issuance of subpoenas to news reporters. See, eg., Comment,
Constitutional Protection for the Newsman's Work Product, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 119, 123
(1970).
12. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
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appear to present an appropriate response from a separation of powers
perspective 13 and to provide a workable framework within which the ad-
verse effects associated with attorney-directed subpoenas can be mini-
mized. In some isolated respects, however, the guidelines are ill-
conceived and should be revised. This note accordingly suggests a
number of modifications to the guidelines as promulgated.
I. THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE GRAND JURY
FUNCTION: AN INHERENT TENSION
Effective law enforcement is a fundamental governmental function
in which "the grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated
role."1 4 The Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he grand jury's investi-
gative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be
discharged."' 5 Central to the effective discharge of its responsibility is
the grand jury's right, subject to valid claims of privilege, to "every
man's evidence."' 16
Attorneys have traditionally not been accorded a special exemption
from the reach of grand jury subpoenas.17 The recent crescendo of attor-
ney-directed subpoenas has been due largely to the relevance of certain
aspects of attorneys' fees arrangements to racketeering-related investiga-
13. See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
14. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972).
15. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974).
16. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRi-
ASs AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)); see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1973) (same).
The importance of society's interest in maintaining grand jury access to "every man's evidence"
is demonstrated in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzbur& the Court rejected the
claim that a reporter could refuse to comply with a grand jury subpoena on first amendment
grounds. Maintenance of the grand jury's access to every man's evidence was deemed to override
"the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that
reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them iti the course of a valid grand
jury investigation." Id. at 690-91.
17. See In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting absence of "absolute
rule that frees an attorney, merely because he is such, to refuse to give unprivileged evidence to a
grand jury"); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.) (attorneys have no privilege to refuse to
appear before grand jury), cert denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); In re Special, Sept. 1983, Grand Jury
(Klein), 608 F. Supp. 538, 542 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (same); In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (lawyers are obliged, "not less than others, to give their non-privileged knowledge
to the grand jury"); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Weiner), 754 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir.
1985) (attorney's formal right to assert privilege, combined with informal incentives, such as loyalty
to client, adequately protect against improper disclosure before grand jury); United States v. Wolf-
son, 558 F.2d 59, 66 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[The ordinary presumption is] that a lawyer is competent to
protect his client's confidential interests before the grand jury."); United States v. Mackey, 405 F.
Supp. 854, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (attorneys' training concerning privileged and confidential commu-
nications make inadvertent breaches unlikely).
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tions.1I A material element in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise 19 pros-
ecution is the financial gain of the enterprise,20 and testimony pertaining
to the amount of compensation paid an attorney may be useful in demon-
strating the existence of substantial unexplained wealth on the part of the
client.21 In RICO prosecutions, proof of enterprise financial gain,
though not a material element of the offense, may nonetheless be viewed
by the trier-of-fact as persuasive evidence of a pattern of racketeering
activity. 22 Additionally, evidence that a single benefactor paid the fees of
several individuals represented by the same attorney may be useful in
establishing the existence of a conspiracy.23 Finally, information relating
18. There has also been heightened attention given to the role that a small minority of defense
attorneys play in organized crime. See STAFF OF PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED
CRIME, MATERIALS ON ETHICAL ISSUES FOR LAWYERS INVOLVED WITH ORGANIZED CRIME
CASES (1985); Lawyers Called Organized Crime "Life Support,' N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).
20. Id. § 848(b)(2)(B).
21. See, e.g., In re Witnesses Before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 490 (7th
Cir. 1984) (government claimed that fee information was relevant for investigation of continuing
criminal enterprises); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting that attor-
ney's compelled testimony relating to fees paid by defendant was clearly relevant to issue of substan-
tial income), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 605 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y.) (fee information would supply gov-
ernment with additional evidence of "substantial income," an element of 21 U.S.C. § 848), rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 147 (2d
Cir. 1979) (evidence of possession and receipt of huge sums of money offered to establish that de-
fendant obtained substantial income or resources from criminal enterprise), cert denied, 446 U.S.
907 (1980).
22. See, e.g., In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.1984) (government sought fee information
as evidence of unexplained wealth derived from criminal activity); United States v. Castellano, 610
F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (lawyer's activities regarding receipt of payment could indicate
existence of enterprise in which attorney's fees were treated as "a cost of doing business, and as a
means for selecting attorneys who would function with the crew's interests in mind"); cf United
States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 146 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Evidence of the possession and receipt of huge
amounts of money is highly relevant in an operation in which the costs of the commodity and the
profits thereon are astronomical."), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Magnano, 543
F.2d 431, 437 (2d Cir. 1976) (evidence of defendant's possession of huge sums of cash admissible to
show "means" for narcotics trafficking), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977); United States v. Hinton,
543 F.2d 1002, 1012-13 (2d Cir.) (proper in narcotics prosecution to introduce evidence of large
expenditures of cash), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
23. See eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 251 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) (payments made to attorney for representation of third parties highly probative of role of
benefactor as head of "enterprise" as defined in RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982)), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 1515 (1986); In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1984) (government sought fee
information to tie each client to drug conspiracy by showing prior arrangements for legal representa-
tion of ringleader's "recruits"); In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[P]ayment of another
person's legal fees may imply facts about a prior or present relationship with that person."); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1982) ("T]he act of furnishing bail
and counsel was an act done in furtherance of the illegal scheme itself .... ); cf United States v.
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 147 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendants had all filed tax returns reflecting large
amounts of unexplained income; fact that all these returns had been prepared by the same law firm
in Detroit, "a city quite distant from the alleged sites of defendants' operations," found "relevant...
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to fee amounts could be useful in net worth tax evasion prosecutions.24
Where the attorney is the sole source of information pertaining to the
amount or circumstances of fee payments, a rule severely restricting
grand jury access to that attorney's testimony may in turn severely crip-
ple any attempted investigation.
Despite such concerns, the interests of the public in law enforcement
must be balanced with other interests of society deemed significant and
worthy of protection. In this respect, commentators argue that the inter-
ests that underlie the protection traditionally accorded the attorney-cli-
ent relationship are significantly eroded when the attorney is compelled
to appear before the grand jury.2 5 Objections to this practice have taken
many forms. Critics contend that merely requiring an attorney to appear
before a grand jury undermines the trust and confidence of the client who
is himself under investigation. 26 The possibility that an attorney may be
subpoenaed is said to chill the attorney-client relationship by discourag-
ing the client from fully disclosing information necessary for the prepara-
tion of a viable defense.27
Moreover, critics have repeatedly charged that a prosecutor armed
with a grand jury subpoena in effect controls the right to counsel.28 Be-
to establish the existence of the conspiracy and its membership"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980);
United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir.) (Mann Act prosecution; defendant's having paid
legal fees for woman accused of prostitution could be used to show that defendant's "interest in the
woman went to the point of retaining and paying for a lawyer to secure her release"), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 752 (1944); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (decision
of a number of defendants to retain same lawyer may suggest association among them).
24. See, eg., In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 629 (7th Cir. 1985) (investigation of potential income
tax violations; subpoena called for retainer contracts and other business and financial documents
relating to clients); In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.)
(government sought fee information pursuant to investigation of possible tax evasion), vacated on
other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 191-
92 (9th Cir. 1980) (fee amount sought for use in "net worth" approach to computing tax liability); cf
In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1982) (fee information sought in
investigation of individuals associated with tax protest organization).
25. See Pierce & Colamarino, supra note 1, at 822.
26. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("The
very presence of the attorney in the grand jury room, even if only to assert valid privileges, can raise
doubts in the client's mind as to his lawyer's unfettered devotion ... and thus impair or at least
impinge upon the attorney-client relationship.").
27. See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (4th Cir.) ("If the
attorney complies with the subpoena and appears before the grand jury behind closed doors, a sub-
stantial chilling effect on truthful communications from the client to the attorney thereafter would be
likely, especially if the client is indicted."), vacated on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
28. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1985) ("IT]he
unbridled use of the subpoena would potentially allow the Government, in this and future cases, to
decide unilaterally that an attorney will not represent his client."), vacated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp.
943, 945-46 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (calling target's attorney before the grand jury may lead to disqualiflca-
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cause a lawyer's grand jury testimony may be adverse to the client, and
because the government may on the basis of that testimony decide to call
the attorney as a witness at a subsequent trial, critics see the grand jury
subpoena as a vehicle by which the government can selectively bring
about the disqualification of defense counsel. Such a result not only
would deny a client his choice of counsel,2 9 but, were it to be routinely
repeated, would be likely to create a substantial disincentive to the prac-
tice of criminal litigation. Finally, pervading these concerns is the possi-
bility that an untenable conflict of interest might develop should the
subpoenaed attorney himself become a target of the grand jury
investigation. 30
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIAL SOLUTIONS
Each approach examined in this section-use of the courts' supervi-
sory power to police of attorney-directed subpoenas, expansion of the
attorney-client privilege, and constitutional protection of the attorney-
client relationship at the grand jury stage-is premised upon the well-
founded belief that the attorney-client relationship may be eroded when
the attorney is made to appear before the grand jury. Yet the choice of
which corrective measures are most appropriate must be analyzed in
light of competing societal interests and separation of powers concerns.
This note applies such an analysis to each of the alternative approaches
tion; attorney-client relationship may be impaired); Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 1, at 739 (use
of grand jury subpoena power combined with threat that prosecutors may seek forfeiture of attor-
neys' fees under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 results in a situation where the "govern-
ment controls the right to counsel").
29. The right of a defendant to be represented by chosen counsel has been held to be a qualified
sixth amendment right. See, eg., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982)
(although not an absolute right, defendant's right to counsel of his own choosing is of constitutional
dimensions), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 2154 (1984); United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 203 n.18 (2d
Cir.) (defendant has a right to counsel of his own choice), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977). The
precise nature of a grand jury witness's right to chosen counsel is, however, unclear. The weight of
current authority holds that a grand jury witness has no rights at all under the sixth amendment.
See infra note 96 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that even in the context of
disqualification motions in civil litigation, courts have consistently averted to both the policy against
arbitrary infringement of choice of counsel, see eg., Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d
804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976), and the policy against the use of disqualification motions as a tactical device
to deprive an opponent of competent counsel, see, e-g., Greenebaum Mountain Mortgage Co. v.
Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Colo. 1976). One commentator has sug-
gested that there is no reason why a grand jury witness's choice of counsel should not be accorded at
least the same level of solicitude. See Moore, Disqualification of an Attorney Representing Multiple
Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1, 18-20
(1979).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing appellant's
claim that, because his lead counsel at trial was a subject of alleged government investigation, he was
deprived of effective assistance of counsel).
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and concludes that each exhibits substantial shortcomings. The guide-
lines issued by the Department of Justice, because their implementation
provides adequate safeguards without unduly burdening the grand jury's
constitutional function and without contravening the principle of separa-
tion of powers, emerge as the best response.
A. Supervisory Power.
One approach that has won support in academic and legal circles3'
is the "supervisory power" 32 solution pioneered by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in In re Special Grand Jury No.
81-1 (Harvey). 33 Before an attorney-directed subpoena will be judicially
enforced, the Harvey rule requires that the government make a prelimi-
nary showing "that the information sought is relevant to and needed for
an investigation being conducted by the grand jury."' 34 The Harvey rule
is a variant of the rule pertaining to subpoenas duces tecums established
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United
States v. Schofield.35 In Schofield, the court held that before a witness
could be held in contempt for failure to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum, the government must make a "preliminary showing by affidavit
that each item is at least relevant to an investigation being conducted by
the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought pri-
marily for another purpose. '3 6 In adapting the Schofield rule to subpoe-
nas issued to attorneys, the Harvey court determined that the preliminary
31. See Pierce & Colamarino, supra note 1, at 867-71; Ross, supra note 1, at 38-40.
32. The term "supervisory power" has come to describe the authority underlying a broad range
of judicial action. Generally, courts use this term to refer to an inherent judicial power to oversee
and preserve the integrity ofjudicial proceedings. For discussions of the origins and development of
the supervisory power doctrine, see Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Con-
stitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433
(1984); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1963).
33. 676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane).
Harvey no longer has precedential value in the Fourth Circuit. The panel opinion was with-
drawn after the target whose attorney was subpoenaed had been indicted and became a fugitive from
justice. The subsequent history of the Harvey case is discussed in In re Grand Jury Proceedings in
the Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the Harvey supervisory
power approach but limited the Harvey rule by holding that the preliminary showing would be
required only when the testimony would result in the attorney's disqualification. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1985). Doe was subsequently vacated en
banc. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986).
34. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1011.
35. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973), later appeal, 507
F.2d 963 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
36. Id. at 93.
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affidavit must show the additional element of "need."'37
Other circuits considering the issue have declined to adopt the Scho-
field preliminary showing requirement for subpoenas duces tecums.3 8 A
number of courts have also expressly rejected the attorney subpoena ver-
sion of that rule.39 Those courts refusing to adopt the supervisory power
approach have commonly done so on the ground that its application
would unduly disrupt and hamper grand jury proceedings.40 Reluctance
to impose a Schofield-like requirement also flows from deference to the
37. The court stated that the prosecution must make two inquiries when making the showing of
need: (1) whether "the information sought [is] necessary or important to the grand jury investiga-
tion," and (2) whether "the subpoenaed attorney [is] the best source for the information." Harvey,
676 F.2d at 1011 n.6. The court continued that a "showing that the information cannot be obtained
from another source would, of course, be important to, but not necessarily conclusive for, the second
inquiry." Id.
38. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 243 (2d Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Battle), 748 F.2d 327, 330 (6th Cir.
1984); United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109
(1983); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224,
1227-28 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Guerrero), 567 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Investigation (McLean), 565
F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686, 686 (9th
Cir. 1977) (per curiam); In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179, 184 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Universal Mfg. Co.), 508 F.2d 684, 686 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam).
39. See In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 632-34 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wei-
ner), 754 F.2d 154, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221,
1223 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575
(11th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bowe), 694 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1lth Cir. 1982); In re
Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (1lth Cir. 1982).
40. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 248 (2d Cir.) (en
bane) (imposition of "need" showing "would hamper severely the investigative function of the grand
jury, if not stop the grand jury 'dead in its tracks' "), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986); In re Klein,
776 F.2d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing the need not to delay grand jury proceedings: "In the
meantime targets are free, memories of other witnesses are fading, evidence is disappearing, the
grand jury may have difficulty proceeding against other targets, and events may escape scrutiny as
the statute of limitations takes its toll."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Weiner), 754 F.2d 154, 156
(6th Cir. 1985) (imposition of preliminary showing requirement would "create an additional impedi-
ment to the grand jury's search for relevant information"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) ('In view of the presumption that
the government obeys the law, we see no reason to inject into routine grand jury investigations the
delay and imposition upon district courts that will be opened up by a rule institutionalizing these
disclaiming affidavits.").
The Supreme Court has voiced a similar concern that delay in the grand jury context be mini-
mized. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court stated, "Any holding that would
saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investiga-
tion and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal
laws." Id. at 17. Cf H.R. REP. No. 1064, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) ("[Delay] ... may be
intolerable from a law enforcement standpoint, e.g., in investigating such crimes as highly mobile
drug trafficking or ongoing crimes which endanger the health and safety of the public, or where the
ability to obtain a conviction through eyewitness identification diminishes rapidly with the passage of
time.").
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principle that grand jury subpoenas should not ordinarily be subject to
preliminary review by the courts for relevance and need.41 Alternatively,
the preliminary showing approach has been criticized on the ground that
its imposition in fact has only minimal effect, since the showing of need
in the grand jury context can be easily made.42
Thus the advisability of the supervisory power approach to attorney
subpoenas is questionable because it may impede the grand jury process.
Apart from this practical concern is a more fundamental matter arising
from separation of powers considerations.43 One commentator has per-
suasively questioned the authority of the courts of appeals to establish
procedural rules for the district courts where a statutory or constitu-
tional basis is wanting. 4 Though trial courts possess the power to quash
subpoenas that are oppressive or unreasonable, 45 courts of appeals have
no parallel statutory authority to impose blanket procedural rules per-
taining to grand jury subpoenas.46 When a court of appeals without con-
stitutional or statutory authority imposes a rule intended to control the
conduct of federal prosecutors, separation of powers concerns are impli-
cated.4 7 As a panel in the Ninth Circuit recently stated: "A federal
court that imposes sanctions on executive conduct that is otherwise per-
mitted by the Constitution, a federal statute or a rule will most likely be
invading the executive sphere rather than protecting itself from
invasion. ''48
41. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1973) ("The [grand] jurors may act on
tips, rumors, evidence offered by the prosecutor, or their own personal knowledge .... And a
sufficient basis for an indictment may only emerge at the end of the investigation when all the evi-
dence has been received.") (citations omitted); In re Special February 1975 Grand Jury (Lopez), 565
F.2d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1977) ("A grand jury is not under a duty to disclose reasons for the informa-
tion it seeks."); In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179, 184 (10th Cir.) ("Relevancy and materiality are not
pertinent to subpoena enforcement."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975).
42. Although no reliable empirical evidence exists, the Schofield rule has been characterized as
not having "caused any serious disruption of grand jury proceedings." Hearings on HR. 94 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judi.
ciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1589 (1977) (memorandum by Alfred M. Nittle and Martin H. Belsky).
One reason for this lack of disruption may lie in the simple fact that a mere recitation of the fact that
a valid investigative purpose exists suffices to establish need. See Weiner, supra note 1, at 121 n.161.
43. See Beale, supra note 32, at 1521.
44. Id.
45. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
46. See In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 19 (Ist Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that decision
whether to quash attorney-directed subpoena "is one that turns on particular facts as evaluated by a
district court"); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The practical responsibility for
controlling grand jury excesses lies with the district court .... ").
47. Beale, supra note 32, at 1521; Note, .4 Separation of Powers Approach to the Supervisory
Power of Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REv. 427, 448-49 (1982).
48. United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985); cf In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628,
632 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A grand jury tracks down leads, and even innocent-looking information may
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The Supreme Court itself has condemned unwarranted judicial in-
terference with the issuance of grand jury subpoenas. In United States v.
Dionisio,49 the Court held that the fourth amendment requires no prelim-
inary showing of reasonableness before a grand jury witness can be com-
pelled to furnish a voice exemplar.50 The Court noted that if the grand
jury is "to approach the proper performance of its Constitutional mis-
sion, it must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external
influence or supervision so long as it does not trench upon the legitimate
rights of any witness called before it.'"51 The Third Circuit in Schofield
distinguished Dionisio, noting that Dionisio held only that the Constitu-
tion required no preliminary showing and therefore did not limit the
lower courts' supervisory powers over the conduct of grand jury proceed-
ings.52 This distinction has found few proponents in the federal judici-
ary. Most courts instead derive from Dionisio the broader proposition
that the judiciary should give wide berth to the manner in which grand
jury proceedings are conducted.5 3
Thus, the supervisory power approach is subject to attack on the
ground that it contemplates impermissible judicial interference within a
sphere recognized as the proper domain of executive discretion. Critics
of attorney subpoenas have advanced a separation of powers argument of
their own, however, and have argued that the exercise of the
prosecutorial discretion in question constitutes the usurpation of a judi-
cial function. These critics have charged that some federal prosecutors
may issue a subpoena upon an attorney with the ulterior motive of ulti-
mately effecting the attorney's disqualification.5 4 This charge is ill-
founded for two reasons. First, it must be borne in mind that "the Con-
stitution ... [will] not tolerate the transformation of the grand jury into
an instrument of oppression. '5 5 Under federal criminal procedure, grand
jury subpoenas are subject to motions to quash on the ground of oppres-
siveness,5 6 and a district court would accordingly be obliged to grant a
motion to quash on the ground that the subpoena was issued with the
be useful .... How much information is 'enough' is a matter for the judgment of the grand jurors
and the prosecutor rather than the courts.").
49. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 17-18.
52. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 89 (3d Cir.), later appeal, 507 F.2d
963 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
53. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 28.
55. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 12 (1973) (discussing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972)).
56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). Although Rule 17(c) on its face applies only to subpoenas for
documents, in In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.
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primary purpose of disrupting an attorney-client relationship.5 7 For ex-
ample, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently
affirmed a district court decision to quash grand jury subpoenas issued
upon attorneys representing clients in litigation pending in state court on
the ground that the timing of the subpoenas made them unreasonable
and oppressive.58
The preliminary showing requirement would probably be of ques-
tionable value as an aid in the review of such motions to quash. Even in
the Third Circuit, a Schofield affidavit is sufficient if it merely recites
some legitimate investigative purpose.5 9 Consequently, there is little rea-
son to believe that the preliminary showing requirement will lead to the
development of a factual record sufficient to serve as a basis for ruling on
a motion to quash.
Secondly, no court has held that a disqualification motion may be
sustained solely because an attorney has given testimony before the grand
jury that is possibly adverse to his client. There is little case law on the
precise point. However, courts have routinely applied sixth amendment
standards to judge disqualification motions brought on other grounds in
the grand jury context.60 The subject of disqualification will be taken up
more thoroughly below in the discussion of the Department of Justice
guidelines; 61 the point here is simply that there is little case law sug-
gesting that the decision to subpoena an attorney before the grand jury
irrevocably spells the disqualification of the attorney or in any substantial
way derogates from the judicial determination that must be made in con-
nection with a disqualification motion.
1984), the rule was invoked to quash subpoenas requiring the appearance of attorneys before a grand
jury.
57. See In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 633 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Of course, if the district court finds
that a subpoena is sought for the purpose of disrupting the relationship between a target and his
attorney, then the court could in its discretion quash the subpoena under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) as
unreasonable or oppressive.").
In an analogous context, the Supreme Court warned that "[o]fficial harrassment [through the
issuance of grand jury subpoenas] of the press undertaken not for the purposes of law enforcement
but to disrupt a reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no justification."
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972). Likewise, a district court would presumably be
obliged to quash an attorney-directed subpoena issued solely to disrupt an attorney-client relation-
ship. Additionally, attorney-directed subpoenas are subject to being quashed if used in aid of pur-
poses unrelated to the grand jury function. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1985) (qdashing attorney-directed subpoena
used for impermissible purpose of preparing for trial); In re Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (quashing attorney-directed subpoena used as an adjunct to FBI investigation).
58. In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
59. Weiner, supra note I, at 121 (discussing implementation of the Schofield rule in the Third
Circuit).
60. See infra note 130.
61. See infra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
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The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently adopted an ap-
proach similar but not identical to the Harvey rule.62 Like the supervi-
sory power approach, the Massachusetts rule contemplates judicial
supervision of attorney subpoenas. Unlike the federal supervisory power
approach, however, judicial oversight is not brought to bear at the stage
of subpoena enforcement. Instead, Massachusetts prosecutors who do
not obtain judicial authorization for the issuance of the subpoena are sub-
ject to professional discipline.63
The Massachusetts rule, insofar as it requires judicial approval
based on a preliminary showing by the prosecutor, is subject to the same
objections as those raised against the Harvey rule: it may impede the
investigatory function of the grand jury and cause unnecessary delay in a
context in which time is of the essence.64 On the other hand, the remedy
contemplated-professional discipline-would impair the operation of
the grand jury less than would the subpoena nonenforcement remedy
contemplated by the Harvey rule. Nevertheless, the across-the-board ap-
plicability of the Massachusetts rule does impose an undesirable con-
straint on prosecutorial discretion, and the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions would be better confined to cases of demonstrated bad faith or
harassment.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege.
As an alternative to the supervisory power solution, some authori-
ties have suggested that judicial expansion of the attorney-client privilege
would alleviate many of the problems associated with attorney-directed
subpoenas. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
privileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States." 65 In effect, Rule
501 authorizes the federal courts to expand and develop common law
62. The rule, effective January 1, 1986, states:
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney to a grand jury with-
out prior judicial approval in circumstances where the prosecutor seeks to compel the at-
torney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is represented by the
attorney/witness.
MASS. SUP. JUDICIAL CT. R. 3:08 (PF15). See also Massachusetts Adopts Rule on Subpoenaing
Attorneys, 38 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2140 (Nov. 13, 1985).
63. Id.
64. The application of the Massachusetts rule to federal prosecutors was challenged in federal
district court by the United States Attorney for Massachusetts on two grounds: (1) lawyers who
believe that the subpoena will threaten the attorney-client privilege may move to quash the sub-
poena, and (2) the State of Massachusetts, by imposing this requirement on federal prosecutors,
violates the supremacy clause since such advance judicial approval is not required under federal law.
The court rejected both arguments. See Weld v. Klublock, No. 85-4809, slip op. (D. Mass. Feb. 28,
1986).
65. FED. R. EvID. 501.
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privileges.66 Judicial initiative pursuant to this invitation would not be
unprecedented. For example, federal courts have recognized a common
law privilege for newsreporters under Rule 501 in both criminal and civil
cases. 67
The attorney-client privilege might be expanded in two possible di-
rections. The first would involve severing the attorey-client privilege
from its traditional mooring in confidential communications and accord-
ing it the greater breadth associated with a "status" privilege. Utnder this
approach, the attorney-client relationship itself would be viewed as suffi-
ciently important to society to justify insulating it completely from in-
quiry. Such an approach is the logical extension of the argument that the
relationship of trust and confidence essential to an effective attorey-cli-
ent relationship is eroded when the attorney is compelled to testify before
the grand jury.68 An analogy might be drawn to the marital testimonial
privilege, which finds its modern justification in "its perceived role in
fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship, ' 69 a re-
lationship that, like the attorey-client relationship, is deemed to serve
important social purposes.
A "status" expansion of the attorey-client privilege, however,
would be problematic in several respects. Adoption of a status-based
privilege would completely repudiate the accommodation of competing
social interests reflected in the traditional privilege based on confidential
communications. 70 Under a status-based regime, probative information
would be barred from disclosure no matter how compelling the govern-
66. For a discussion of the policy of Rule 501, see C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5422 (1980).
67. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980) (criminal), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1126 (1981); see also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489,
492-95 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (civil).
68. See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (4th Cir.) ("If the
attorney complies with the subpoena and appears before the grand jury behind closed doors, a sub-
stantial chilling effect on truthful communications from the client to the attorney thereafter would be
likely, especially if the client is indicted."), vacated on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
69. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
70. One commentator has stated:
Once the privilege is extended beyond communications to bar an inquiry about actions
taken by a lawyer for the benefit of the client.. . , there is a danger that clients will use the
attorney-client relationship to immunize public activities from public scrutiny and to pre-
vent investigative bodies ... from inquiring into actions for which a client may be legally
responsible. The loss of information could be substantial. To avoid this loss of informa-
tion, courts are justified in restricting the privilege. The privilege is intended to foster
communications, not to make the attorney an agent whose agency is not subject to judicial
inquiry.
Saltzburg, Communication Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IOWA L. REV. 811, 823-
24 (1981).
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ment's need.71 Such a broad privilege would create an incentive to use
attorneys as "conduits of information or of commodities necessary to
criminal schemes."' 72 Indeed, criminal activity on the part of attorneys
themselves would become more difficult to uncover.
Furthermore, the analogy to the marital testimonial privilege-the
paradigm status privilege-does not withstand close scrutiny. The mari-
tal testimonial privilege has been much criticized, 73 and its continued vi-
tality today is probably due mostly to a resigned recognition that spousal
testimony is inherently unreliable and therefore of questionable value
when compelled. In contrast, an attorney is an officer of the court, and
expectations concerning trustworthiness are justifiably greater with re-
gard to his testimony. Both the heightened trustworthiness of attorney
testimony and the fact that such evidence will in many cases be essential
to a successful investigation militate for striking a different balance than
that which has been struck in the case of spousal testimony.
The attorney-client privilege might also be expanded in a second
direction. An attorney-client privilege incorporating the client's privi-
lege against self-incrimination has been developed by some courts to pro-
tect attorney fee information from compelled disclosure. 74 This self-
incrimination gloss has been defined differently by the various courts em-
ploying it. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held that information subpoenaed from an attorney is protected if disclo-
sure "would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of
inculpatory events or transactions. ' 75 The UAited States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit has held that otherwise unprivileged informa-
tion may be protected from disclosure if it would "implicate that client in
71. Where the attorney-client privilege is held to apply, courts have not been willing to make ad
hoe determinations based on balancing the interests involved in the particular case. See Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REv.
464, 468-69 (1977).
72. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984).
73. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2228 (labeling the marital testimonial privilege "the
merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice").
74. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218-19 (9th Cir. 1979)
(attorney had "just" reason to assert attorney-client privilege where disclosure of names and fee
arrangements would implicate clients in past conspiracy); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517
F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[I]nformation, not normally privileged, should ... be protected when
so much of the substance of the communications is already in the government's possession that
additional disclosures would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of inculpatory
events or transactions."); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir.
1980) (noting that fee arrangements "might be protected ... if the person asserting the privilege can
show a strong probability that disclosure of the fact of retention or of the details of a fee arrangement
would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought"), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981).
75. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought." 76
The genesis of the self-incrimination variation of the attorney-client
privilege can be traced to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Baird v. Koer-
ner. 77 In Baird, an attorney submitted a payment to the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) at the request of several anonymous clients. Having
been advised by the attorney that they had understated their taxes in
preceding years, the clients sought to make the payment through the at-
torney in order to avert possible prosecution. After he had submitted the
payment, the attorney was served with an IRS summons requesting the
names of the clients. The Ninth Circuit held that the attorney's refusal
to disclose the identities was justified because the content of his legal
advice to the anonymous clients had already been revealed, and the fur-
ther act of revealing the clients' identities would link specific individuals
to that content and thus amount to a disclosure of confidential attorney-
client communications. 78
Several circuits have expressed disdain for the "incrimination ap-
proach" to the attorney-client privilege. This disdain stems largely from
a reluctance to part with the precepts of the traditional privilege. The
attorney-client privilege in its traditional form serves to protect only con-
fidential communications. 79 The underlying jistification of the privilege
is that the adversarial process can only operate through the preparation
and pursuit of vigorous defenses. 0 Full disclosure by the client is seen as
essential to that end, and the privilege is designed to encourage such dis-
closure.81 Because the operation of the privilege denies the government
access to potentially probative information, however, courts have long
required that it be strictly construed.8 2 Courts have accordingly held
76. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
77. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
78. Id. at 630.
79. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356-58 (4th Cir. 1984) (attorney-client
privilege applies only where communication sought to be protected is intended to be confidential).
80. Cf United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) ("The interests of society and the
accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that
adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case.").
81. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (purpose of attorney-client privilege is
"to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys").
82. Id ("[S]ince the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the
factfinder, it applies only when necessary to achieve its purpose."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 710 (1974) ("fEixceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984) (attorney-client privilege is to be "strictly confined");
In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983) (because "invocation
of the privilege before the grand jury may jeopardize an effective and comprehensive investigation
into alleged violations of the law," it must be "narrowly construed"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524
(1984); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2291 (attorney-client privilege must be strictly
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that fee information lacking a confidential communication predicate is
not protected by the attorney-client privilege, even where it may incrimi-
nate the client.83 Thus, the traditional attorney-client privilege has not
been construed to enable an attorney to assert vicariously his client's self-
incrimination privilege in the absence of a confidential communication
predicate.84
Were an "incrimination approach" expansion of the attorney-client
privilege uniformly recognized with respect to fee arrangements, proba-
tive information would be strictly barred from disclosure no matter how
construed because it is inconsistent with general duty to disclose and impedes investigation of the
truth).
83. See In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984). The Shargel court noted that a general
rule requiring disclosure of the fact of consultation and the payment of a fee does not force attorneys
to caution against disclosure and thus render ill-formed advice. Such information is therefore not
protected by the privilege even though it may incriminate the client. Id. See also In re Witnesses
Before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 491-92 (th Cir. 1983) (rejecting "incrimina-
tion rationale" for finding exception to rule that fee information is not privileged); United States v.
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir.) (payment of fees is generally not privileged information be-
cause such payments are not communications made for purpose of obtaining legal advice), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1980) (infor-
mation regarding fee arrangement ordinarily is not part of subject matter of professional consulta-
tion and therefore not privileged communication even though it may evidence wrongdoing by the
client); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 473 n.4 (3d Cir.
1979) (emphasizing that it is link between client and communication, rather than link between client
and possibility of potential criminal prosecution, which brings client identity under the attorney-
client privilege); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976) (although fee informa-
tion was incriminatory, "the crucial question is whether such disclosure violates the substance of a
confidential communication between attorney and client"), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 432 U.S. 137 (1977); United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974)
(absent confidentiality, the privilege does not apply; payment of a fee is not normally matter of
confidential communication); In re Semel, 411 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir.) ("In the absence of unusual
circumstances, the fact of a retainer, the identity of the client, the conditions of employment and the
amount of the fee do not come within the privilege of the attorney-client relationship."), cert denied,
396 U.S. 905 (1969); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962) (circumstances of
retainer not normally covered by the privilege, "even though the fact of having retained counsel may
be used as evidence against the client"), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
In one recent Ninth Circuit case, the court of appeals appeared to abandon the incrimination
approach it had led the way in developing. See In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983)
("Information regarding the fee arrangement ordinarily is not part of the subject matter of the pro-
fessional consultation and therefore is not privileged communication even though it may evidence
wrongdoing by the client.").
84. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976) ("[T]he [fifth amendment] privilege
'was never intended to permit [a person] to plead the fact that some third person might be incrimi-
nated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of such person .... [T]he Amendment is
limited to a person who shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'' ")
(emphasis added) (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Wilson), 760 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument that fifth and sixth amendments sup-
port a claim of privilege by attorney whenever client could refuse to answer the same question on the
basis of client's privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537, 539 (6th
Cir. 1975) (fifth amendment privilege is personal and "does not permit an attorney to plead that his
client may be incriminated by his testimony"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
compelling the government's need. 5 The incrimination approach opens
the door too wide when applied to facts other than those presented in
Baird. For example, the Baird principle has been applied to protect the
identity of a third party benefactor. 86 Yet the relationship between the
attorney and the third party benefactor is not one established by the ben-
efactor in order that he may personally obtain legal advice. Rather, the
"relationship" involves a transfer of funds resulting in the retention of
the lawyer as legal representative of some person or persons other than
the benefactor. Because the benefactor, unlike the delinquent taxpayers
in Baird, neither seeks nor receives legal advice from the lawyer, no privi-
lege should apply and the benefactor's identity'should not be protected. 87
C. Constitutional Provisions.
Some courts and commentators have intimated that sixth amend-
ment concerns may provide a basis for limiting attorney-directed subpoe-
nas.88 Additionally, lower federal courts have on occasion suggested that
the due process clause constitutes a basis for some aspects of a right to
counsel in grand jury proceedings.8 9 Commentators have periodically ar-
gued that further constitutional safeguards should be afforded to protect
the right to counsel at the grand jury stage.90
Under conventional analysis, however, the sixth amendment right to
counsel does not attach at the grand jury stage, even where the client-
85. See S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:23 (1986).
86. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575-76 (11th Cir. 1983)
(benefactors could not claim privilege because they were not attorney's clients in matter for which
fee was paid and about which attorney was interrogated); Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 69-71,
409 N.E.2d 983, 987, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (1980) (no attorney-client relationship arises out of
payment of another's attorney's fees; if independent relationship is alleged to exist, its existence must
be demonstrated by independent facts beyond the attorney's statement). But see Note, Benefactor
Defense Before the Grand Jury: The Legal Advice and Incrimination Theories ofthe Attorney-Client
Privilege, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 537, 560-61 (1985) (arguing that attorney's assertion that attorney-
client relationship exists should suffice because an attorney's word is entitled to respect, and that
attorney-client relationship should be deemed to attach when client reveals facts to attorney tending
to establish criminal liability).
88. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 972 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated,
781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986); In re Special Grand Jury No.
81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1011-12 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 697 F.2d 112, 113 (4th
Cir. 1982) (en banc); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Right to Counsel for the Party Under
Investigation, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 507-09 (1985).
89. See In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1186 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[To arbitrarily forbid (a grand
jury witness] from retaining a particular attorney... would deprive him of his constitutional right to
due process of the law . )..."); cf In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that fifth
amendment due process clause might prohibit effort by government to "impose on the defendant the
expense of paying multiple lawyers").
90. See Newman, The Suspect and the Grand Jury. A Need for Constitutional Protection, 11 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1, 9-15 (1976); Note, supra note 88, at 507-09.
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witness is a target of a grand jury investigation. In Kirby v. Illinois, 91 a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to
counsel "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial pro-
ceedings have been initiated." 92 Grand jury proceedings traditionally
have not been identified as "adversary judicial proceedings." In United
States v. Mandujano,93 another plurality of thq Court considered and re-
jected the claim that one has a right to have counsel present in the grand
jury room. 94 Relying on Kirby, the plurality concluded that as applied to
a grand jury witness, the sixth amendment right to counsel has not yet
"4come into play." 95 Although Mandujano addressed only the question
of the right to have counsel present in the grand jury room, post-
Mandujano lower court decisions have generally embraced the broader
proposition that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not extend to
any aspects of grand jury representation.96
As an alternative to sixth amendment analysis, the due process
clause might be thought broad enough to comprehend challenges arising
from attorney-directed subpoenas. In Powell v. Alabama, 97 the Supreme
Court asserted that the concept of due process historically included "the
right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party assert-
ing the right. ' 98 The Court held that a defendant's right to counsel in-
91. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion).
92. Id. at 688.
93. 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (plurality opinion).
94. Id. at 581.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.) (en
banc), cert denied 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986); United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982);
In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 64 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Heuwetter, 584
F. Supp. 119, 125 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 575 F. Supp. 197, 204
(N.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. 211,
213-14 (S.D. Fla. 1977); United States v. DeRosa, 438 F. Supp. 548, 551 (D. Mass. 1977); aff'd, 582
F.2d 1269 (1st Cir. 1979).
Some lower federal courts have nevertheless employed sixth amendment standards when assess-
ing the adequacy of advice tendered a grand jury witness or the adequacy of representation in in-
stances of multiple representation. See, eg., In re Gopman, 537 F.2d 262, 268 (5th Cir. 1976)
(suggesting in dictum that qualified sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies
to grand jury proceedings). Lower federal courts have also on occasion suggested that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and even the first amendment guarantees may consti-
tute independent grounds for various facets of the right to counsel at the grand jury stage. See, eg.,
United States v. Soto, 574 F. Supp. 986, 989-90 (D. Conn. 1983) ("[A] Grand Jury witness who has
not been granted immunity may possess a constitutional right to counsel proceeding from the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination... if indeed the Grand Jury witness' 'privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination is... involved.' ") (quoting United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 602 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
97. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
98. Id. at 68.
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cludes "a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." 99 And in
Chandler v. Fretag, 100 the Court held that due process contemplates "a
reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with counsel." 101
In light of the charge that a grand jury subpoena may be issued with
the ulterior motive of disqualifying a target's chosen counsel, these
Supreme Court decisions suggest a basis for arguing that fundamental
fairness may be undermined unless strictures are imposed on attorney-
directed subpoenas. 10 2 It must be borne in mind, however, that in the
due process right to counsel cases the individuals involved were, unlike a
grand jury witness, parties to litigation. This distinction is significant be-
cause the basis of the due process right to counsel is the right to a fair
hearing. 10 3 Mere witnesses, unlike parties, are not entitled to a hearing
and its panoply of incidental procedural rights.104 Thus, reliance on the
Powell-Fretag line of cases to place strictures on the issuance of attorney
subpoenas in the course of grand jury proceedings appears to be
foreclosed. 105
Despite the adverse precedent discussed above, it has been argued
that the attorney-client relationship must be accorded special protection
at the grand jury stage if the sixth amendment right to counsel is to have
99. Id. at 53.
100. 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
101. d at 10.
102. Cf. In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that fifth amendment due process
clause might prohibit effort by government to "impose on the defendant the expense of paying multi-
ple lawyers... in order to have a single defense"); United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075
(3d Cir. 1982) (implying that the due process clause of the fifth amendment prevents the arbitrary
dismissal of chosen counsel), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 246 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (rejecting argument that grand
jury target's "due process rights under the Fifth Amendment are more expansive than the protection
which the Sixth Amendment affords and therefore would require a greater showing before the gov-
ernment can enforce the subpoena" issued upon attorney), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986).
103. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or
federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and,
therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.") (emphasis added).
104. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). The Court in Blair stated:
[The grand jury witness] is not entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy,
such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his. . . . [Nor is he] entitled to
challenge the authority of the court or of the grand jury, provided they have a de facto
existence and organization.... [Nor is he] entitled to set limits to the investigation that
the grand jury may conduct.
Id. at 282.
105. See S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 85, § 6:17, at 95. Beale and Bryson conclude,
however, that a due process theory would be an attractive basis for the right to counsel in the grand
jury context because of its flexibility: it could be extended on a case-by-case basis; it would not
necessarily imply a corollary right to appointed counsel for grand jury witnesses; and courts would
be allowed to respond to the unique features and requirements of the grand jury without being
obliged to extend the same protection to witnesses subpoenaed in other contexts. Id.
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any meaning subsequent to indictment. 10 6 The propriety of extending
relief on such grounds is rendered questionable by Supreme Court deci-
sions demonstrating an unwillingness to extend constitutional protection
to the period preceding indictment-even where significant rights of the
prospective defendant stand to be affected. 10 7 Because the recognition of
constitutional restrictions on a prosecutor's ability to subpoena an attor-
ney to appear before a grand jury would arguably entail fewer costs than
the forms of relief requested in those decisions, however, the Supreme
Court might be willing to countenance the imposition of such restric-
tions. Presumably, such protection would involve a judicial determina-
tion that an attorney-client relationship exists and that the information
sought is essential to a successful investigation. Militating against the
sanctioning of such relief are judicial reluctance to disrupt grand jury
proceedings with "mini trials"' 0 8 and the difficulty of measuring the im-
portance of the information to the grand jury investigation before the
investigation is over and all the evidence is gathered. Where later consti-
tutional trial rights stand to be substantially affected, however, courts
might nevertheless be willing to countenance this limited and relatively
unburdensome imposition.
Even if such relief remains unavailable, the fact that the attorney is
subpoenaed and testifies before the grand jury should not in itself be de-
terminative of a later motion to disqualify the attorney from representing
the client at trial. Like motions to disqualify on other grounds in the
grand jury context, such a motion should be judged according to the
qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of one's choice. This issue
will be discussed with greater detail in the section that follows.
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES: COMPLIANCE,
APPLICATION, AND PROPOSED REVISIONS
The preceding discussion detailed the technical and theoretical ob-
jections that may be raised against the various proposals for insulating
the target's attorney from the grand jury subpoena. Yet this analysis
should not obscure the primary objection to these alternative approaches:
in many instances, the function of the grand jury to discover criminal
106. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 972-73 (2d Cir. 1985), va-
cated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. dented, 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986).
107. See, eg., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972); (refusing to impose per se exclusionary
rule upon testimony concerning identification of defendant who had not been advised of right to
counsel where the identification was made prior to the initiation of prosecution); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10 (1966) (rejecting argument that sixth amendment was violated because
government continued to question defendant without observance of his right to counsel at time when
government allegedly had sufficient ground to bring charges).
108. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974).
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activity promptly and to bring properly founded charges would be frus-
trated were the grand jury's access to probative nonprivileged informa-
tion possessed by the attorney restricted.
In light of the public's interest in maintaining a viable defense bar,
however, the executive branch has a critical responsibility to avoid using
its powers in ways that unnecessarily impair the attorney-client relation-
ship. Placing questions of effective compliance aside for the moment, the
new guidelines issued by the Department of Justice provide an appropri-
ate framework for the exercise of that responsibility.
The guidelines set out an explicit procedure to be followed in every
case where a prosecutor seeks to subpoena an attorney. They first re-
quire that the prosecutor receive the approval of an Assistant Attorney
General. 0 9 This approval is to be based upon a determination (1) that
the information is reasonably needed for the successful completion of the
investigation; 110 (2) that the government has unsuccessfully made reason-
able attempts to obtain the information from alternative sources"' and
voluntarily from the attorney through the medium of informal negotia-
tions;112 (3) that the need for the information outweighs the risk that the
attorney will be disqualified;"13 (4) that the information is not protected
by a valid claim of privilege; 14 and (5) that the subpoena is directed at
material information regarding a limited subject matter.115
Viewed in the abstract, these guidelines are superior to the alterna-
tive approaches discussed above. Unlike the supervisory power solution,
the guidelines do not contemplate the imposition of extra-executive con-
straints and therefore do not pose troublesome separation of powers im-
plications. 16 And in contrast to an expanded privilege regime, the
guidelines have an inherent, and substantial, degree of flexibility. Under
the guidelines, "the approach must be to strike the proper balance be-
tween the public's interest in the fair administration of justice and effec-
tive law enforcement and individual's right to the effective assistance of
counsel." 1 7 A good faith application of this balancing principle would
109. USAM, supra note 5, § 9-2.161(a)(D).
110. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(1).
111. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(B); cf United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 363 (Ist Cir. 1981) (re.
jecting argument that government must show that evidence is unobtainable from other sources when
compliance with such requirement would force government to settle for less than its best evidence).
112. USAM, supra note 5, § 9-2.161(a)(C).
113. Id § 9-2.161(a)(F)(4).
114. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(6).
115. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(5).
116. The guidelines contain a forceful disclaimer to the effect that they are not intended to create
any judicially enforceable rights. Id. § 9-2.161(a).
117. Id. § 9-2.161(a)(A).
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bar use of the grand jury subpoena for the purpose of harassment, includ-
ing the kind of covert abuse not readily discernible by courts.
A. The Prospects for Compliance.
The guidelines are vulnerable to the criticism that good faith appli-
cation may not be forthcoming. Critics are quick to label any self-moni-
toring approach as ineffectual and cosmetic. In this case, however, both
internal incentives and external constraints should combine to produce
effective compliance. First, the Department of Justice has a clear institu-
tional interest in policing attorney-directed subpoenas according to the
flexible plan contained in the guidelines. By developing a record of
demonstrated good faith compliance with the guidelines, the Department
of Justice would successfully preempt the judicial imposition of measures
more restrictive of its prerogatives.' 18 On the other hand, failure to fol-
low the self-imposed guidelines would only add fuel to the momentum
currently building for a judicially fashioned solution.
Second, it appears that the Department's guidelines for issuing sub-
poenas to newsreporters (after which the present guidelines are closely
modelled)119 have been effective. Although comprehensive statistical
support is unavailable, there is evidence that the institution of those
guidelines had the effect of reducing the number of federal subpoenas
issued upon members of the news media. 20
Third, although the guidelines expressly purport to create no judi-
cially enforceable rights,' 2' some courts have demonstrated a willingness
118. The promulgation of agency regulations is often spurred by threatening legislative or judi-
cial action. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 118 (1979).
119. Reporter Subpoena Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1985).
120. See Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. LEGcs. 233, 252-53 (1974).
121. USAM, supra note 5, § 9-2.161(a) concludes: "These guidelines... are set forth solely for
the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may
not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in
any matter, civil or criminal .... ." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
stated that defendants may not rely on the courts to apply and enforce these guidelines. In re Klein,
776 F.2d 628, 635 (7th Cir. 1985); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d
236, 245 n.1 (2d Cir.) (en bane) (rejecting argument that attorney subpoena guidelines are to be
judicially enforced: "That the government does not issue such subpoenas at whim is hardly a con-
cession that the government also believes that a heightened showing, assessed by the courts, is re-
quired before an attorney may be called to appear before the grand jury."), cert denied, 106 S.Ct.
1515 (1986). Other provisions in the Attorney's Manual contain similar language, and federal courts
have generally respected these disclaimers. See, eg., United States v. Schulman, 466 F. Supp. 293,
300 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("IThere are more than enough exceptions, caveats, provisos and limiting
adjectives in the [United States Attorney's Manual] guidelines as to make them practically worthless
and illusory as a basis for seeking judicial interposition between the United States Attorney and his
daily tasks."). See generally S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 85, § 10:21. Courts have refused to
dismiss indictments on the basis of the government's noncompliance with Attorney's Manual guide-
lines concerning grand jury testimony of targets, see In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1972),
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to consider the extent of compliance with other internal standards when
confronted with challenges alleging prosecutorial misconduct before the
grand jury.122 The possibility that these guidelines would also be used by
courts as an objective measure of the extent of prosecutorial misconduct
should influence the seriousness with which the subpoena authorization
procedures are observed.
B. Disqualification.
The guidelines' treatment of one of the most common objections to
attorney-directed subpoenas-that the government may issue grand jury
subpoenas with the illicit purpose of ultimately disqualifying counsel-
merits particular attention. 123 The Code of Professional Responsibility
directs that an attorney shall withdraw from continued representation
when it becomes "apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to
his client."' 124 Critics of attorney subpoenas have pointed to this ethical
directive and have charged that the prosecutor can unilaterally .use the
grand jury subpoena as a vehicle to disqualify a potential defendant's
chosen counsel.
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973), and forthwith subpoenas, see United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d
1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court addressed the judicial enforceability of administrative standards in United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). Prior to Caceres, some courts of appeals used a due process
theory to invalidate government action taken in contravention of agency regulations. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sourapas, 515 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975) (evidence obtained in IRS investigation
suppressed where agents had failed to give Miranda-like warnings as required by IRS regulations).
In Caceres, however, the Court held that tape recordings made by IRS agents in violation of an IRS
regulation were admissible in a criminal prosecution. The Court concluded that compliance with the
regulation was not constitutionally or statutorily mandated. Id. at 749-51. The Court further noted
that the IRS agents had acted in good faith, id. at 752, and that the defendant had not detrimentally
relied upon the IRS regulation. Id. at 752-53. The scope of Caceres might be restricted by giving
weight to these latter two factors. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 118
(1979). An argument for the judicial enforcement of the attorney subpoena guidelines is therefore
not entirely foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Cacere.
122. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 518 F. Supp. 179, 185 (C.D. Cal. 1981)
(violation of Department of Justice's policy regarding forthwith subpoenas "relevant ... to set the
tone of this entire investigation and defines at the outset the overreaching of the government in its
presentation to the Grand Jury"), rev'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1079 (1984); cf United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (subpoena
issued upon reporter quashed; Department of Justice guidelines governing reporter subpoenas had
not been followed).
Some courts have suggested that flagrant and entrenched violations of agency regulations might
justify judicial intervention on a supervisory power basis. See United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d
1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Myers, 510 F. Supp. 323, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
123. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
124. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-102(B) (1979). But see Rice v.
Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that DR 5-102(B) was "not designed to
permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as witness and thereby disqualify him as counsel") (cita-
tions omitted).
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The guidelines respond to this concern by providing that a "reason-
able need" for the information sought "must outweigh the risk that the
attorney will be disqualified from representation of the client as a result
of having to testify against the client." 125 "Reasonable need" as used in
this context presumably is a shorthand for the other requirements listed
in the text-that the information be material, that reasonable attempts
have been made to obtain the information from alternative sources, and
that the information be reasonably necessary for the successful comple-
tion of the investigation.
Assuming an absence of improper prosecutorial motive, if all of the
criteria set out in the guidelines are found to exist, there is no reason why
the potential for disqualifying counsel should by itself preclude com-
pelled disclosure. Attorneys, like other citizens, are duty-bound to aid a
grand jury in its investigation. 12 6 Society's interest in preserving an at-
torney-client relationship, insofar as that interest is founded upon the
belief that such relationships are instrumental to the fair administration
of justice, must yield when sheltering that relationship would preclude
achieving a just result. 127
Thus, in terms of the public interest, the prospect that some attor-
neys will be disqualified is not intolerable. An intolerable situation
would arise, however, were it in fact the case, as critics charge, that pros-
ecutors could automatically disqualify defense attorneys by issuing a
grand jury subpoena. Such abuse clearly would be possible if an attor-
ney's compelled appearance before a grand jury investigating his client
automatically precluded his representing that client at trial. However,
disqualification is not the inevitable result.
The charge that an appearance before the grand jury automatically
spells disqualification is without foundation. The attorney who has ap-
peared before a grand jury should, in many cases, succeed in resisting a
later trial subpoena.1 28 The attorney will only be disqualified from repre-
senting the client at trial if a court determines that his testimony is
125. USAM, supra note 5, § 9-2.161(a)(F)(4).
126. See In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (lawyers "are obliged... not less
than others, to give their non-privileged knowledge to the grand jury").
127. See United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1981) ("It is inconceivable that
defendant's right to a particular counsel should be permitted to impose [substantial] artificial disad-
vantages upon the government."); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166 (10th Cir. 1980)
("A defendant's right to obtain counsel of his choice must be balanced against the need for the
efficient and effective administration of criminal justice."), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United
States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 936 (2d Cir. 1963) ("An accused's right to select his own counsel
... cannot be insisted upon or manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or to
interfere with the fair administration of justice."), cerL denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
128. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986). The Doe court stated:
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needed at that trial. 129 Because the outcome of the determination di-
rectly impacts the client's sixth amendment rights in a context-his
trial-where such rights have clearly attached, such a determination nec-
essarily involves a weighing of sixth amendment interests.1 30 Conse-
quently, an unethical prosecutor's attempt to effect an attorney's
disqualification via a grand jury subpoena will fail unless the court deter-
mines that a showing of need for the attorney's testimony at trial has
been made which is sufficiently compelling to override the defendant's
qualified sixth amendment right. Once such a showing of need is made,
speculation as to the prosecutor's original motive in issuing the grand
Before disqualification can even be contemplated, the attorney's testimony must incrimi-
nate his client; the grand jury must indict; the government must go forward with the prose-
cution of the indictment; and ultimately, the attorney must be advised that he will be called
as a trial witness against his client. As a court, we decline to speculate that all those events
will occur .... [The] attorney's grand jury testimony may be exculpatory or neutral, or
... the government may decide not to use such information at trial, or ... the information
may be presented at trial in such a way that the attorney can avoid testifying, or... the
judge may rule in limine that the information is not admissible, perhaps because its proba-
tive force does not justify a resulting disqualification of counsel.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding unpersuasive
the "likelihood of disqualification" objection to grand jury attorney subpoenas, and asserting that
subsequent trial subpoena "is not the most likely consequence of the attorney's appearance before
the grand jury").
129. See United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 363 (Ist Cir. 1981) (attorney's adverse testi-
mony appeared in grand jury record; court nevertheless analyzes need for attorney's testimony at
trial and concludes that client's sixth amendment rights did not bar requiring attorney to testify at
trial where absence of testimony "would ... weaken the government's case directly by a serious
diminution of the total evidence"); In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1977) (unethical for
lawyer to participate in a trial both as counsel and witness) (emphasis added).
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[i]f, after undertaking employ-
ment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm may be called as a witness other than on behalfofhis client, he may continue the representation
until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrrY DR 5-102(B) (1979). Obviously, if the testimony is not needed at
trial, and the attorney is accordingly not required to testify, no prejudice accrues and no ethical
obligation to withdraw arises. In determining whether the attorney should be required to testify at
trial, a court should bear in mind the admonition that DR 5-102(B) was "not designed to permit a
lawyer to call opposing counsel as a witness and thereby disqualify him as counsel." Galarowicz v.
Ward, 119 Utah 611, 620, 230 P.2d 576, 580 (1951). The Code apparently would not require dis-
qualification in any event where the testimony sought relates solely to "the nature and value of legal
services rendered.., by the lawyer or his firm to the client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 5-101(B)(3) (1979).
130. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. A majority of the decisions addressing the
issue of attorney disqualification on the grounds of conflict of interest in the grand jury context
assume that the witness had a sixth amendment right to counsel of his choice. See In re Grand Jury
Empanelled Jan. 21, 1975 (Curran), 536 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Gopman, 537 F.2d
262, 268 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 436 F. Supp 818, 820 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 576 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 428
F. Supp 273, 277-78 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 521, 341 A.2d 896, 900 (1975),
appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976); see also In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1186 n.l
(2d Cir. 1977) (suggesting that due process clause is implicated in disqualification motions in the
grand jury context).
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jury subpoena becomes irrelevant, because the court has separately and
independently determined that the attorney's testimony is needed at trial.
If the court determines that a sufficient showing of need for the at-
torney's testimony at trial has not been made, the attorney should not be
compelled to testify at the trial and no disqualification should ensue. The
defendant's qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of choice there-
fore would not be impaired as a consequence of a possible illicit
prosecutorial motive for issuing the subpoena at the grand jury stage.
Thus, contrary to the charges levelled by several commentators, it
remains the judiciary's, not the executive's, function and obligation to
determine whether an attorney should be disqualified. 31 It is reasonable
to believe that an attorney may be compelled to give testimony poten-
tially adverse to his client before the grand jury and yet still be eligible to
represent the client at trial. Each branch-the executive and the judi-
cial-must be allowed the full exercise of its prerogative within its consti-
tutionally recognized sphere.
Even where the standard necessary to disqualify an attorney at trial
is met, disqualification might still be avoided if the testimony in question
relates to fee amounts. 32 The guidelines should be revised to include a
provision requiring that in cases involving testimony concerning fee
amounts, the government request and accept a "sanitized" stipulation.
Such a stipulation would merely state that the defendant possessed a spe-
131. Lower federal courts have suggested various formulas indicating the appropriate showing to
be made in the context of a disqualification motion. See Grady v. United States, 715 F.2d 402, 404
(8th Cir. 1983) (attorney's withdrawal did not infringe defendant's right to counsel where attorney's
testimony was "important to the prosecution because it tended to establish... an element of [the
defendant's] offense"); United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 363 (lst Cir. 1981) (testimony of
defendant's attorney could be required at trial where absence of such testimony "[n]ot only would
... weaken the government's case directly by a serious diminution of the total evidence, .. . [but]
would create a singular question in the jurors' minds-how was it that [the attorney], the most
significant witness, had not testified?"). Compare United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.)
("[A] party's attorney should not be called as a witness unless his testimony is both necessary and
unobtainable from other sources."), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975) with United States v. Cortel-
lesso, 663 F.2d 361, 363 (1st Cir. 1981) (government "not required to accede to this truncation of its
evidence.., if it means that the government must settle for less than its best evidence") and United
States v. Gomez, 584 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (D.R.I. 1984) (refusing to "shackle" prosecution with
requirement that evidence must be unobtainable from other sources).
132. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.) (en banc)
(noting possibility that disqualification could be averted through use of a stipulation), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1137, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stipu-
lation to facts for proof of which government requires attorney's testimony may enable attorney to
continue as counsel, "since 'uncontested' testimony does not require withdrawal"); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985, 605 F. Supp. 839, 850-51 (S.D.N.Y.) (attorney could
avoid appearing as grand jury or trial witness were defendant to supply fee information in sworn
statements that could be admitted at trial either through stipulation or by testimony of noncon-
spirator witness), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d. Cir. 1985).
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cific sum of money on a specific date.133 The fact that this sum was used
to pay an attorney for legal services rendered need not be included in the
stipulation; this detail is irrelevant where fee information is sought, for
example, to establish the existence of substantial unexplained wealth on
the part of the client.' 34 Thus, the attorney would not have to testify at
trial and disqualification would be averted. Even where information
other than fee amounts is sought, a sanitized stipulation might effectively
avert disqualification. 135
C. Proposed Revisions.
The guidelines contain a number of deficiencies that should be cor-
rected through revision. For example, the provision encouraging the
133. See In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that attorney-client
relationship was not threatened where government required counsel to produce date, amount, and
form of payment).
134. Cf United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976) (fee information disclosed
was simply an element of defendant's expenditures for a year; nothing more was elicited "than would
have been elicited by introducing evidence that the defendant had bought a Rolls-Royce for cash
(i.e., a substantial expenditure)"), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 432 U.S. 137
(1977).
135. United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d 361, 364 (Ist Cir. 1981) (the "whole counsel-witness
issue would disappear" were defendant to have stipulated that agreement about which attorney's
testimony was sought had been made).
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated, 781
F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 1515 (1986), the court of appeals intimated that a stipula-
tion as to fee arrangements would be ineffective to avert disqualifieation, citing the Third Circuit
case, Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1984). Doe, 759 F.2d at 973 n.6.
It is questionable, however, whether Zepp stands for the proposition that a stipulation relating to any
aspect of an attorney-client relationship is necessarily invalid. In Zepp, a suspect and her attorney
conferred alone inside the suspect's house while police officers waited outside. The officers heard a
toilet flush several times. A subsequent search of the septic tank produced a number of glassine bags
containing cocaine residue. After the suspect had been charged with possession, the parties agreed
to a stipulation wherein the defendant's attorney stated that he did not flush any toilets while in the
house. Zepp, 748 F.2d at 128-29.
The court of appeals found from these facts that there was an actual conflict of interest that
required disqualification of the attorney. Zepp, 748 F.2d at 136. The court emphasized that the
attorney may have made the stipulation in order to avoid the possibility that he himself would be
incriminated. Id. at 136-39. As a further ground for its decision, the court asserted that the attor-
ney, by making the stipulation, had in fact become a witness for the prosecution. Id. at 137. The
court emphasized that the attorney's stipulation would tend to eliminate doubt the jurors may have
had as to whether it was in fact the defendant who had flushed the toilet while she and the attorney
were alone in the house. Id. at 137.
The determinative factors in the Zepp decision simply would not be present in typical cases
wherefee information is sought in the course of a grand jury investigation. The attorney would not
normally be in a situation where he himself stood to be incriminated; the stipulation would therefore
not have the effect of inculpating the client at the very same time that it exculpates the attorney. If
the defendant is permitted to proffer a "sanitized" stipulation, the jury will not be made aware that
the amount stipulated to was paid in attorneys' fees, and therefore there will be no danger that the
jury might get the impression from the stipulation that the defendant's own lawyer is presenting
evidence against him.
GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
prosecutor to pursue negotiations 136 with the attorney from whom infor-
mation is sought may pose some potential for abuse. A similar provision
is included in the Justice Department's guidelines governing the issuance
of subpoenas to members of the news media.137 In that context such a
provision is not objectionable because the privilege involved belongs to
the reporter, not his source. An attorney, in contrast, is forbidden by the
Code of Professional Responsibility to reveal a confidence or secret 138 of
his client, except when required by law or court order.139 The Code de-
fines "secret" broadly to include information which "would be likely to
be detrimental to the client."' 4 This definition might encompass the
kind of unprivileged fee information that would be sought through the
contemplated negotiations. Thus, bothersome ethical questions may
arise from the very fact that negotiations take place at all.141
A structure for negotiations, however, would in many cases be desir-
able and in the best interest of the client under investigation by the grand
jury. The perceptive defense attorney representing the target witness
may be able to gauge the direction of the grand jury's investigation by the
tenor of such negotiations. Moreover, based on discussions with the at-
torney and an evaluation of the nature of the evidence within the attor-
ney's possession, the prosecutor may decide that the case against the
client was weaker than previously believed and may consequently drop
or refocus the investigation. On the other hand, however, personal con-
siderations-such as a desire to avoid becoming personally implicated in
the criminal activity-may induce the attorney to make inappropriate
disclosures in order to avoid a professionally damaging appearance
before the grand jury. Thus, while the informal negotiations contem-
plated by the guidelines should normally benefit the client under investi-
gation, their availability may tempt some attorneys to make disclosures
that are not in their clients' best interests.
The guidelines could preserve the beneficial aspects of negotiations
while avoiding this ethical problem if revised to require that no negotia-
tions be conducted in the client's absence. Although the client's presence
might dampen the candor or frankness of the negotiations, it would also
diminish the likelihood that the lawyer might inadvertently disclose cli-
ent "secrets" or deliberately divulge client confidences in order to avoid a
grand jury appearance.
136. USAM, supra note 5, § 9-2.161(a)(C).
137. Reporter Subpoena Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) (1985).
138. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(1) (1979).
139. Id. DR 4-101(C)(2).
140. Id. DR 4-101(A).
141. ABA GRAND JURY COMMITrEE, PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR CALLING OF LAWYERS AS
GRAND JURY WITNESSES 3 n.1 (1985).
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Unnecessary erosion of attorney-client trust could also be avoided
by requiring that prosecutors allow the subpoenaed attorney the option
of either appearing before the grand jury in person or submitting written
answers to interrogatories. 142 This procedure would allay the fear ex-
pressed by some commentators that an attorney's appearance behind the
closed doors of the grand jury room in and of itself puts a chill on client
trust.143 Although such a procedure would deny the grand jurors the
opportunity to assess the attorney-witness's demeanor, the use of tran-
script testimony before the grand jury has been sanctioned by courts in a
variety of circumstances when deemed expedient. 144 Providing this op-
tion would admittedly smack of special treatment for lawyers; it would
not, however, have the effect of restricting government access to the in-
formation sought. Impairment of attorney-client trust could be further
minimized if the guidelines required that the client be provided with a
transcript of the attorney's grand jury testimony. Such a practice would
not contravene the policy of grand jury secrecy, because any witness is
free to reveal his grand jury testimony to a third party,1 45 and presuma-
bly the attorney would communicate the content of his testimony to the
client.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Department of Justice's guidelines governing the issuance of
subpoenas upon attorneys merit serious consideration for a number of
reasons. First, on a practical level, the alternative approaches discussed
in this note have not enjoyed widespread acceptance. Instead, a number
of courts have found these proposals insupportable under existing case
law. Thus far, only the supervisory power approach has won any degree
of judicial acceptance, and even that acceptance has been sharply limited.
Second, when compared to the supervisory approach, the guidelines
emerge as the more appropriate response in light of separation of powers
considerations. The supervisory power approach, because it lacks a stat-
utory or constitutional predicate, impermissibly interferes with the exec-
142. Cf In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that attorney-client
relationship was not impaired and noting that attorney was offered option of providing information
without having to appear before the grand jury); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 568 F.2d 555, 556
(8th Cir. 1977) (noting that trial court had conditionally quashed attorney-directed subpoena pro-
vided that attorney answer written interrogatories or appear in person), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999
(1978).
143. See In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
144. See S. BEALE & W. BRYSON, supra note 85, § 10:07.
145. Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure imposes no obligation of secrecy on
grand jury witnesses. See In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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utive functions of federal prosecutors. This note has sought to expose the
weakness of the charge often levelled by apologists for the supervisory
power approach that a federal prosecutor armed with a grand jury sub-
poena "controls the right to counsel." Two factors have been identified
that suggest that such a charge is ill-founded. First, courts will entertain
motions to quash attorney subpoenas on the ground of oppressiveness.
Second, motions to disqualify an attorney who has testified before the
grand jury will be judicially determined and will be tested according to
standards developed to protect the qualified sixth amendment right to
counsel of one's choice.
To the extent that the right to counsel is judicially protected in these
respects, grand jury access to the testimony it seeks should not otherwise
be subject to judicial restriction. Each branch should be allowed the full
exercise of its discretion within its proper sphere. As applied to grand
jury subpoenas, the guidelines provide a prudent formula for self-re-
straint within a sphere recognized as the proper domain of executive dis-
cretion. External restraint would impermissibly impair the grand jury's
ability to carry out its mandate to investigate criminal activity and to
bring charges where appropriate.
Michael F Orman
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